
CSci530: Computer Security Systems
Authentication

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Identification vs. Authentication

Identification

Associating an identity with an individual, process, or request

Authentication

– Verifying a claimed identity

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Basis for Authentication

Ideally

Who you are

Practically

Something you know

Something you have

Something about you

(Sometimes mistakenly called things you are)

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Something you know

**Password or
Algorithm**

e.g. encryption key derived from password

Issues

Someone else may learn it

Find it, sniff it, trick you into providing it

Other party must know how to check

You must remember it

How stored and checked by verifier

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Examples of Password Systems

Verifier knows password

Encrypted Password

One way encryption

Third Party Validation

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Attacks on Password

Brute force

Dictionary

Pre-computed Dictionary

Guessing

Finding elsewhere

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Something you Have

Cards

- Mag stripe (= password)
- Smart card, USB key
- Time varying password

Issues

- How to validate
- How to read (i.e. infrastructure)

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Something about you

Biometrics

- Measures some physical attribute
 - Iris scan
 - Fingerprint
 - Picture
 - Voice

Issues

- How to prevent spoofing
- Suited when biometric device is trusted, not suited otherwise

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Other forms of authentication

- IP Address
- Caller ID (or call back)
- Past transaction information
 - (second example of something you know)

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“Enrollment”

How to initially exchange the secret.

- In person enrollment
- Information known in advance
- Third party verification
- Mail or email verification

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Multi-factor authentication

Require at least two of the classes above.

- e.g. Smart card plus PIN
- Biometric and password

Issues

- Better than one factor
- Be careful about how the second factor is validated. E.g. on card, or on remote system.

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General Problems with Password

- Space from which passwords Chosen
- Too many passwords
- And what it leads to

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Single Sign On


“Users should log in once
And have access to everything”
Many systems store password lists
Which are easily stolen
Better is encryption based credentials
Usable with multiple verifiers
Interoperability is complicating factor.

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Encryption Based Authentication

- Proving knowledge of encryption key
 - Nonce = Non repeating value


$\{\text{Nonce or timestamp}\}_{K_c}$



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Authentication w/ Conventional Crypto


- Kerberos or Needham Schroeder



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Authentication w/ PK Crypto

- Based on public key certificates




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Kerberos

Third-party authentication service

- Distributes session keys for authentication, confidentiality, and integrity



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Lecture ended Here

- Remaining slides were covered
In lecture 7.

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Public Key Cryptography (revisited)

- Key Distribution
 - Confidentiality not needed for public key
 - Solves n^2 problem
- Performance
 - Slower than conventional cryptography
 - Implementations use for key distribution, then use conventional crypto for data encryption
- Trusted third party still needed
 - To certify public key
 - To manage revocation
 - In some cases, third party may be off-line

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Certificate-Based Authentication

Certification authorities issue signed certificates

- Banks, companies, & organizations like Verisign act as CA's
- Certificates bind a public key to the name of a user
- Public key of CA certified by higher-level CA's
- Root CA public keys configured in browsers & other software
- Certificates provide key distribution

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
Certificate-Based Authentication (2)

Authentication steps

- Verifier provides nonce, or a timestamp is used instead.
- Principal selects session key and sends it to verifier with nonce, encrypted with principal's private key and verifier's public key, and possibly with principal's certificate
- Verifier checks signature on nonce, and validates certificate.

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Secure Sockets Layer (and TLS)



Encryption support provided between
Browser and web server - below HTTP layer
Client checks server certificate
Works as long as client starts with the correct URL
Key distribution supported through cert steps
Authentication provided by verify steps

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Trust models for certification

- X.509 Hierarchical
 - Single root (original plan)
 - Multi-root (better accepted)
 - SET has banks as CA's and common SET root
- PGP Model
 - "Friends and Family approach" - S. Kent
- Other representations for certifications
- No certificates at all
 - Out of band key distribution
 - SSH

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