

CSci530: Computer Security Systems
Authentication (continued)
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Public Key Cryptography (revisited)

- **Key Distribution**
 - Confidentiality not needed for public key
 - Solves n^2 problem
- **Performance**
 - Slower than conventional cryptography
 - Implementations use for key distribution, then use conventional crypto for data encryption
- **Trusted third party still needed**
 - To certify public key
 - To manage revocation
 - In some cases, third party may be off-line

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Certificate-Based Authentication

Certification authorities issue signed certificates

- Banks, companies, & organizations like Verisign act as CA's
- Certificates bind a public key to the name of a user
- Public key of CA certified by higher-level CA's
- Root CA public keys configured in browsers & other software
- Certificates provide key distribution

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
Certificate-Based Authentication (2)

Authentication steps

- Verifier provides nonce, or a timestamp is used instead.
- Principal selects session key and sends it to verifier with nonce, encrypted with principal's private key and verifier's public key, and possibly with principal's certificate
- Verifier checks signature on nonce, and validates certificate.

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Secure Sockets Layer (and TLS)



Encryption support provided between
 Browser and web server - below HTTP layer
Client checks server certificate
 Works as long as client starts with the correct URL
Key distribution supported through cert steps
Authentication provided by verify steps

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Trust models for certification

- **X.509 Hierarchical**
 - Single root (original plan)
 - Multi-root (better accepted)
 - SET has banks as CA's and common SET root
- **PGP Model**
 - "Friends and Family approach" - S. Kent
- **Other representations for certifications**
- **No certificates at all**
 - Out of band key distribution
 - SSH

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Global Authentication Service

- Pair-wise trust in hierarchy
 - Name is derived from path followed
 - Shortcuts allowed, but changes name
 - Exposure of path is important for security
- Compared to Kerberos
 - Transited field in Kerberos - doesn't change name
- Compared with X.509
 - X.509 has single path from root
 - X.509 is for public key systems
- Compared with PGP
 - PGP evaluates path at end, but may have name conflicts

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Proxies

- A proxy allows a second principal to operate with the rights and privileges of the principal that issued the proxy
 - Existing authentication credentials
 - Too much privilege and too easily propagated
- Restricted Proxies
 - By placing conditions on the use of proxies, they form the basis of a flexible authorization mechanism

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Restricted Proxies



- Two Kinds of proxies
 - Proxy key needed to exercise bearer proxy
 - Restrictions limit use of a delegate proxy
- Restrictions limit authorized operations
 - Individual objects
 - Additional conditions

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Generic Security Services API

Standard interface for choosing among authentication methods

Once an application uses GSS-API, it can be changed to use a different authentication method easily.

Calls

Acquire and release cred
Manage security context
Init, accept, and process tokens
Wrap and unwrap

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Authentication in Applications

Unix login
Telnet
RSH
SSH
HTTP (Web browsing)
FTP
Windows login
SMTP (Email)
NFS
Network Access

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Unix Login (review)

One way encryption of password
Salted as defense against pre-computed dictionary attacks
To validate, encrypt and compare with stored encrypted password
May use shadow password file

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Telnet

A remote login application
Normally just an unencrypted channel over which plaintext password is sent.
Supports encryption option and authentication options using protocols like Kerberos.

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RSH (Remote Shell/Remote Login)

Usually IP address and asserted account name.
Privileged port means accept asserted identity.
If not trusted, request unix password in clear.
Kerberos based options available
Kerberos based authentication and optional encryption

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Secure Shell (SSH)

Encrypted channel with Unix login
Establish encrypted channel, using public key presented by server
Send password of user over channel
Unix login to validate password.
Public key stored on target machine
User generate Public Private key pair, and uploads the public key to directory on target host.
Target host validates that corresponding private key is known.

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Web Browsing (HTTP)

Connect in the clear, Unix Password
Connect through SSL, Unix password
Digest authentication (RFC 2617)
Server sends nonce
Responds is MD5 checksum of
Username, password, nonce URI
User certificate, strong authentication

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File Transfer Protocol

Password based authentication or GSS-API based authentication
Including use of Kerberos
Authentication occurs and then stream is encrypted

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Windows Network Login

In Win2K and later uses Kerberos
In Win NT
Challenge response
Server generates 8 byte nonce
Prompts for password and hashes it
Uses hash to DES encrypt nonce 3 times

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Email

SMTP – To send mail
Usually network address based
Can use password
Can be SSL protected
SMTP after POP

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Email

Post Office Protocol
Plaintext Password
Can be SSL protected
Eudora supports Kerberos authent
IMAP
Password authentication
Can also support Kerberos

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File System Authentication

Sun's Network File System
Typically address based
Athena Kerberized version
Maps authenticated UID's to addresses
NFS built on ONC RPC
ONC RPC has stronger
Kerberos/GSSAPI support

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File System Authentication

Andrew File System
Based on Andrew RPC
Uses Kerberos authentication
OSF's DCE File System (DFS)
Based on DCE RPC
Uses Kerberos authentication

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Network Access Servers

Radius
Problem: Not connected to network
until connection established
Need for indirect authentication
Network access server must
validate login with radius server.
Password sent to radius server
encrypted using key between
agent and radius server

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Delegated Authentication

Usually an authorization problem
How to allow an intermediary to perform
operations on your behalf.
Pass credentials needed to
authenticate yourself
Apply restrictions on what they may
be used for.

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