
CSci530: Computer Security Systems
Intrusion Detection
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Administrative

- All proposals replied to. If you do not have a response send a follow-up message to csci530@usc.edu.
- End-of-term exam on last regular lecture day.
- Research paper officially due the same day, but no penalty if turned in up to one week late.
- Out of town Friday, see me after class if you would otherwise need to meet me during my Friday office hours.

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Intrusion Detection

- Security Enforcement Mechanisms are not foolproof, so we need a way of knowing when they are not working.
 - Or even better, before they stop working
- We need ways to detect insider misuse

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Taxonomy for Intrusion Detection

- What is detected
 - Signature based approaches
 - Anomaly detection
- Where detected
 - Network Based
 - Host Based
 - Application Based
- When attack is detected
 - Real time
 - After the fact

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Basis for detecting attack

- Systems operating normally
 - Activity conforms to statistically predictable patterns.
 - Actions do not include attempts to subvert policy.
 - Actions of processes conform to the policies regarding what they are allowed to do.

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Rating ID systems

- False positives
 - Normal activity flagged as intrusion
 - Affects administrator workload
 - E.g. spam filtering
- False Negatives
 - Attacks that are not detected

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Anomaly Detection

- How it works
 - Analyze baseline characteristics of system or user behavior and record.
 - Compare current characteristics and behavior against baseline.
 - Flag differences
- Why it is hard
 - Deciding how to characterize behavior so that changes reflect intrusions and not normal changes in activities.

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Metrics

- Threshold metrics
 - Number of failed access attempts.
 - Bandwidth consumed.
- State change probabilities (Markov models)
 - Requires training by analyzing normal traces
 - Looking for transitions that don't seem to follow the normal pattern

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Misuse detection

- Whether activities or code is violate site policy.
 - Rule based
 - Signature based.
- Problems
 - Can only detect attacks known in advance.
 - Virus checkers are usually signature based.
 - Many more false negatives (subject to definition)
- Strengths
 - Tend to have fewer false positives.

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Collecting Input Data

- Audit vs. Intrusion Detection
- Network Based ID
- Host Based ID
- Application based ID

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Network Based ID

- Often based on network sniffing
 - Listening to network traffic as it goes by a sensor node
 - Could be placed in routers or other network components
 - Issues?
 - Placement
 - Load
 - Encrypted traffic
 - Determining intent

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Host Based ID

- Scan system and application logs
- Report on system state
- Report activity to ID system
- Issues
 - Only get what applications already put into logs
 - Might not understand the intent of an action.

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Application Based ID

- Application determines what to report to ID system.
 - Based on a policy
- Drawbacks
 - Requires application involvement. Some applications will not report.
 - Authorization functions like GAA-API can help address this limitation.
- Benefits
 - Application understands the objects and entities to which policies apply.

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Issues in Intrusion Detection

- Collecting data on and reporting events
 - Languages, e.g. CIDF
 - Dr. Tung will talk about in his lectures.
- Reducing Data
 - To reduce network traffic consumed
 - Consider overhead
 - Summarize data
 - Finding relationships

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Components of ID systems

- Collectors
 - Gather raw data
- Director
 - Reduces incoming traffic and finds relationships
- Notifier
 - Accepts data from director and takes appropriate action

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Advanced IDS models

- Distributed Ditection
 - Combining host and netwror monitoring (DIDS)
 - Autonomous agents (Crosbie and Spafford)

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Intrusion Response

- Intrusion Prevention
 - (marketing buzzword)
- Intrusion Response
 - How to react when an intrusion is detected

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Possible Responses

- Notify administrator
- System or network lockdown
- Place attacker in controlled environment
- Slow the system for offending processes
- Kill the process

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Phase of Response (Bishop)

- Preparation
- Identification
- Containment
- Eradication
- Recovery
- Follow up

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PREPARATION

- Generate baseline for system
 - Checksums of binaries
 - For use by systems like tripwire
- Develop procedures to follow
- Maintain backups

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IDENTIFICATION

- This is the role of the ID system
 - Detect attack
 - Characterize attack
 - Try to assess motives of attack
 - Determine what has been affected

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CONTAINMENT

- Passive monitoring
 - To learn intent of attacker
 - Learn new attack modes so one can defend against them later
- Constraining access
 - Locking down system
 - Closing connections
 - Blocking at firewall, or closer to source
- Combination
 - Constrain activities, but don't let attack know one is doing so (Honeypots, Jail).

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ERADICATION

- Prevent attack or effects of attack from reoccurring.
 - Locking down system (also in containment phase)
 - Blocking connections at firewall
 - Isolate potential targets

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RECOVERY

- Restore system to safe state
 - Check all software for backdoors
 - Recover data from backup

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FOLLOWUP

- **Take action against attacker.**
 - Find origin of attack
- **Notify other affected parties**
 - Some of this occurs in earlier phases as well
- **Assess what went wrong and correct procedures.**
- **Find buggy software that was exploited and fix**

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